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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
DAN A. PARK, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
Category No. 14 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented in this petition is whether 
the court of appeals properly interpreted and applied this 
Court's decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in 
holding that defendant's consent to search was "invalid" and, 
therefore, that the evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to 
his consent was not admissible? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is 
State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Utah Ct. App. April 10, 
1991), a copy of which is contained in the addendum to this 
petition. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On April 10, 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
decision reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress. The state timely filed requests for a stay of 
remittitur with the court of appeals and for an extension of time 
in which to file this petition with the supreme court. Both 
requests were granted. 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional, statutory or rule 
provisions pertinent to the issue presented for review is 
contained in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Dan A. Park, was charged on May 10, 1989, 
with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent 
to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1990) and possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990) (R. 
5). 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the 
contraband seized from his vehicle pursuant to a warrantless 
search conducted contemporaneously with a roadblock stop (R. 25-
26). The evidentiary hearing established that defendant was 
stopped, along with numerous other vehicles, at a roadblock set 
up by the Utah Highway Patrol for the purpose of detecting 
driver's license, automobile registration, and equipment 
violations (R. 149-51). After being stopped at the roadblock, 
defendant consented to a search of his vehicle, which search 
-2-
revealed five baggies of marijuana and a small amount of 
methamphetamine (R. 141, 143-44, 187, 217, 220-24, 230, 257 269, 
277 J.1 The trial court denied the motion to suppress, ruling 
that the roadblock met federal constitutional standards and that 
defendant had voluntarily consented to the search (R. 49-56). 
Subsequently, defendant was convicted by jury verdict 
of the lesser included offense of possession of marijuana, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990), and possession of methamphetamine as 
charged (R. 102-03). He was sentenced to concurrent statutory 
terms of imprisonment, the execution of which was suspended, and 
defendant was placed on probation under specified terms and 
conditions (R. 109-11). 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed defendant's 
convictions by holding that the roadblock violated the fourth 
amendment of the federal constitution under Michigan Dept. of 
State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), as previously 
determined by the court of appeals in the related case of State 
v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It further held that 
under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), defendant's 
consent to the search of his vehicle was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to avoid the taint of 
that initial illegality and, therefore, the consent was invalid. 
1
 The court of appeals' decision contains an accurate, though 
not complete, statement of the facts in this case. However, for 
purposes of this petition, only a cursory summary of the facts is 
necessary. 
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State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 54 (Utah Ct. App. April 10, 
1991).2 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED 
AND APPLIED THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE 
ARROYO TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF 
THE CONSENT TO SEARCH. 
The state does not seek review of the court of appeals' 
conclusion that the roadblock in this case did not meet federal 
constitutional standards. 
Despite this initial illegality, the issue remains 
whether the subsequent warrantless search of defendant's vehicle 
was nevertheless permissible pursuant to his consent to the 
search. State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 54 (Utah Ct. App. 
April 10, 1991). The state submits that in attempting to apply 
this Court's decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990), the court of appeals both misapplied the test for 
determining the voluntariness of a consent to search and 
effectively decided an important question of law which has not, 
but should be, decided by this Court. Utah Rule of App. P. 46(b) 
and (d). 
As delineated in the state's petition for certiorari 
2
 As noted, the court of appeals considered the virtually 
identical roadblock in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141(Utah Ct. App. 
1991). The state has filed a petition for certiorari in Sims, 
challenging the court's determination that the roadblock did not 
meet state constitutional standards and the court's application of 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Because of the 
similarity of the factual and legal issues, the state will request 
that the Sims and Park cases be consolidated for purposes of 
argument if the petitions for certiorari are granted. 
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filed in the companion case of State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991), this Court in Arroyo left open the question of 
how a reviewing court should consider and balance the factors 
pertinent to the exploitation prong of the two-pronged test 
adopted in that case.3 For the reasons stated in the Sims 
attachment, this has resulted in the court of appeals focusing 
primarily on the attenuation factors of "temporal proximity" and 
"intervening circumstances" without giving proper weight to the 
causal connection and effect of any police misconduct on the 
voluntariness of the consent. 
Instead of considering "temporal proximity" and 
"intervening circumstances" as simply relevant factors under the 
exploitation prong of Arroyo, the court of appeals characterized 
time and place as the main components of what the court referred 
to as an "attenuation analysis." State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 54 (citing State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14).A 
Finding that the consent here was given shortly after the stop, 
and adopting the Sims analysis that any events transpiring at the 
scene of the roadblock could not be considered as "intervening 
circumstances," the court concluded that defendant's consent 
arose from an unbroken "chain of events" beginning with the 
3
 A copy of the pertinent section of the state's petition for 
certiorari in State v. Sims is attached to the addendum. 
4
 Because the Park decision extensively cites to the Utah 
Advance Reports' version of the Sims case, these internal cites 
will be referred to as they were by the court of appeals, without 
reference to the Pacific Reporter citation. The Utah Advance 
Reports' version of Sims is attached to the addendum. 
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roadblock. Id. 
But, as noted by this Court, "all evidence is [not] 
fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come 
to light but for the illegal actions of the police.M State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)). Indeed, the high majority of consent 
searches occur contemporaneously with a stop or detention which 
may subsequently be determined unconstitutional. To adopt the 
emphasis of the court of appeals, that temporal proximity and 
lack of intervening events mandate the invalidation of a consent 
occurring after any illegal police misconduct, would be to allow 
a per se rule of exclusion. Just as the "distinct policies and 
interests of the Fourth Amendment" encourage a rejection of a per 
se rule of admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to a 
consent occurring subsequent to illegal police action, the same 
policies preclude the adoption of a per se or "but for" rule of 
inadmissibility. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975). 
If "temporal proximity" and "intervening circumstances" 
were determinative of the issue of exploitation, this Court would 
not have remanded for a further evidentiary hearing in Arroyo. 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. Instead, applying the 
reasoning of the court of appeals in Park and Sims, this Court 
should have simply reversed Arroyo's conviction. For viewing the 
facts most favorable to the state, even if Arroyo had otherwise 
voluntarily consented to the search after the pretext stop, the 
consent would have "flowed" from the unconstitutional stop and 
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therefore, according to the court of appeals, would have 
necessarily been invalid. This Court rejected such a mechanical 
"but for" analysis by recognizing the factual sensitivity of the 
exploitation prong and the need for additional findings. 
The necessity that this Court clarify the proper 
application of the factors enunciated in Arroyo can further be 
seen by the court of appeals' superficial consideration of the 
purpose and flagrancy of the primary police illegality. The only 
mention of this factor in the Park decision is the conclusory 
statement that "the purpose of the illegal police conduct did not 
correct the constitutional violation." State v. Park, 158 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 54 (citing State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14). 
In Sims, the court concluded that "although it does not appear 
that the officers behaved abusively toward those stopped at the 
roadblock, this does not correct the constitutional violation." 
Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. Not only is this an incorrect 
application of the exploitation prong of Arroyo, but it 
misinterprets the reasons for consideration of the nature of the 
police misconduct. 
The unconstitutionality of police action can never be 
"corrected." Rather, once it is determined that unconstitutional 
police action preceded a search, the issue then becomes whether 
the purpose of the fourth amendment would be served by 
suppression of the evidence subsequently obtained in a voluntary 
consent search or whether, under the facts of a given violation, 
the "exclusionary rule [would impose] a greater cost on the 
-7-
legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by 
the rule's deterrent purposes." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 
(quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 (1975)). 
Further, the analysis of the purpose and flagrancy of 
any police misconduct is not a separate "alternative approach" to 
the "attenuation analysis." State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
14 (adopted in State v. Park, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14). Central 
to any determination of exploitation is the issue of whether the 
consent was obtained as a direct result of flagrant or purposeful 
police misconduct. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689. Thus, in 
deciding the exploitation question, a court considers jointly the 
following factors: 
the temporal proximity of the consent to the 
arrest, the presence or absence of 
intervening circumstances, whether the police 
purpose underlying the illegality was to 
obtain the consent or the fruits of the 
search, whether the consent was volunteered 
or requested, whether the defendant was aware 
he could decline to consent, and 
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of 
the official misconduct. 
People v. Borges, 511 N.E.2d 58, 59-60 (N.Y. 1987) (cited with 
approval in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691). For "the point at which 
the taint can be said to have dissipated should be related, in 
the absence of other controlling circumstances, to the nature of 
that taint." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 609 (J.Powell, 
concurring). 
Because the court of appeals' interpretation and 
application of the exploitation prong of the Arroyo test has 
broad implications governing the admissibility of evidence in 
8 
criminal prosecutions throughout the state, this Court should 
grant r*ei:L IOJ ai i CIMH n^/iew i lie court of appeals1 holding. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and constituent with the 
considerations of rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
state respectfully requests this Court to grant the petition for 
w r i t o f c e r t; ;i \ ;> r a r i . ' 
DATED this (o^h day of June, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accur ate cop} of the 
foregoing petition for certiorari was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Leray G. Jackson, attorney of record for appellant, P.O. Box 
545, Delta, Utah 4 624, tl,.. ^AJ day of Jit mi 2, ] 991. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
52 Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Higley 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
CODE ©CO 
Provo, Utah 
the limits of its policy.4 The statute says that 
the State's claim for recovery "shall be a lien 
against any proceeds payable to the recipient 
(Higley} by that third party.* (Emphasis 
added.) Higley, as the recipient, had a claim 
for recovery against a liable third party. He 
pursued that claim without State consent, thus 
the State's claim against Higley included "any 
proceeds" payable by the third party to the 
extent of the State medical assistance provided 
to him. Camp, 779 P.2d at 246. 
CONCLUSION 
The State became obligated to pay and did 
pay medical assistance in Higley's behalf. 
Higley proceeded to settle his claim against 
third parties without the State's consent. The 
trial court determined that Higley violated the 
requirements of the statute and that the State 
was entitled to recover from Higley the 
medical assistance provided. Since the amount 
of the assistance exceeded the amount of the 
insurance proceeds, the State's recovery nec-
essarily included all the proceeds available to 
Higley under the liable parties' insurance 
policy. We give no deference to the trial 
court's ruling but we find no error requiring a 
different result. Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Salt 
Lake City-County Bd. of Health, 771 P.2d 
671, 673 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). On the undi-
sputed material facts the statute applies and is 
controlling. Camp, 779 P.2d at 245. 
Affirmed. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. For discussion relating to whether the 1984 or 
1989 version of the statute applies, sec infra at pp. 3-
4. 
2. The Medical Benefits Recovery Act operates in 
tandem with the Medical Assistance Act §26-18-
9 to-11 (1989). Section 26-18-10, Utah Medical 
Assistance Program, provides in part: 
(1) The division shall develop a medical 
assistance program, which shall be 
known as the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program, for low income persons who 
are not eligible under the state plan for 
Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act or Medicare under Title 
XVIII of that act.... 
(3) The department shall develop stan-
dards and administer policies relating to 
eligibility requirements for participation 
in the program, and for payment of 
medical claims for eligible persons. 
(4) The program shall be a payor of last 
resort. Before assistance is rendered the 
division shall investigate the availability 
of the resources of the spouse, father, 
mother, and adult children of the person 
making application. 
3. At oral Mgwntnt, tht State conceded that the 
statute is not triggered when the applicant for 
medical assistance has already recovered on his or 
her third-party claim before the State became 
obligated to provide medical assistance. At that 
point, the applicant is required to report the proc-
eeds as income or an asset on the application/ 
affidavit form. Then, the State would take the 
amount of the recovery into account in determining 
the applicant's eligibility for medical assistance. The 
State has other remedies in the event the claim or 
recovery is not reported: 
The department may recover medical 
assistance incorrectly paid, whether due 
to administrative or factual error or 
fraud, from the recipient or his estate 
and may, pursuant to a judgment, 
impose a lien against the property of the 
recipient. 
Utah Code Ann. §26-19-13(5) (1989). 
Civil and criminal penalties are also available to 
the State for false statement or representation rela-
ting to medical benefits. See §§26-20-3,-7,-9 
and-9.5. 
4. The definition of "third party" includes Higley's 
parents who by virtue of the parent-child relatio-
nship "may be liable to pay all or part of the 
medical costs of a recipient under law ...." Utah 
Code Ann. §26-19-2(5)(b)(i). Moreover, Higley 
and his parents are wrecipient(s)ff under the statute 
as the persons who applied for and received the 
medical assistance. 
Cite as 
158 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dan A. PARK, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900260-CA 
FILED: April 10, 1991 
Fourth District, Juab County 
Honorable Boyd L. Park 
ATTORNEYS: 
LeRay G. Jackson, Delta, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Garff. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress and the trial court's 
denial of his motion for a directed \erdicu 
• nr A u A r\i7 A w r r o r o n D T C 
CODE*co Stale v 
Provo, Utth 158 Utah A 
Based on this court's recent decision in State 
v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct. 
App. March 15, 1991), we reverse and 
remand. 
On May 10, 1990, defendant was stopped at 
a roadblock on 1-15 about two miles south 
of Nephi, Utah. The roadblock, consisting of 
about fifteen officers stopping all traffic tra-
veling northbound and southbound except 
trucks, was conducted under the supervision 
of Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul Man-
gelson. Notice of the roadblock was published 
in the local newspapers two weeks earlier. At 
about 8:15 a.m., Officer LuWayne Walkei 
stopped defendant's vehicle and requested his 
license and registration. During the stop, 
Officer Walker detected an odor coming from 
the vehicle and noted that defendant was 
acting unusual. Officer Walker asked defen-
dant if he was carrying alcohol, firearms or 
drugs. All three individuals in the vehicle 
looked straight ahead and said nothing. Def-
endant then quickly turned to Officer Walker 
and said "No". Officer Walker then asked 
defendant if he would mind if the vehicle was 
searched. Defendant responded that it would 
be fine. The officer asked defendant to pull to 
the side of the road and exit the vehicle. All 
three occupants exited and were patted down 
for weapons. Small amounts of marijuana 
were found on the two passengers. In the 
trunk of the vehicle, officers discovered a red 
tool box containing five baggies of marijuana 
and a twenty dollar bill. A subsequent inven-
tory search of the vehicle revealed a metham-
phetamine kit under the console next to the 
driver's seat. Defendant was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute and possession of a cont-
rolled substance. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evid-
ence seized in the search on the ground that 
"1. There was no probable cause nor legal 
reason to stop said vehicle. 2. There was no 
probable cause to search said vehicle. 3. The 
search of said vehicle was illegal and was not 
conducted pursuant to legal consent nor pur-
suant to the legal issuance of > a Search 
Warrant." After an evidentiary hearing, def-
endant submitted a memorandum to the court, 
claiming that the warrantless search of the 
vehicle was unreasonable in that there is no 
statute authorizing such roadblocks and that 
the roadblock did not meet the standard under 
state and federal caselaw. Defendant's mem-
orandum also asserted that the officer's 
request to search the vehicle violated his con-
stitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and that the officers 
lacked probable cause to justify searching the 
trunk and console. The trial court denied the 
motion to suppress, stating that the roadblock 
minimally inconvenienced the public and was 
structured to neutralize the discretion of the 
*•/-— ~~~Atmt\no the roadblock. Thus, the 
court concluded, the stop was a reasonable 
seizure and did not violate defendant's state 
or federal constitutional rights. The court also 
concluded that defendant voluntarily conse-
nted to the search and therefore the search did 
not violate defendant's state or federal cons-
titutional rights. During the trial, the court 
denied defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict. The jury found defendant guilty of 
possession of marijuana and of knowingly and 
intentionally possessing methamphetamines. 
On appeal, defendant raises three issues: 1) 
Whether officers had probable cause or reas-
onable suspicion to detain or seize the vehicle; 
2) Whether defendant's consent was volun-
tary; and 3) Whether the court erred in 
denying his motion for a directed verdict. 
We first consider whether the roadblock 
violated defendant's fourth amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The State narrowly construes the 
issue as a challenge only to whether the offi-
cers had probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion to detain defendant and his vehicle after 
the roadblock stop. Under that narrow reading 
of the issue, the State claims the issue was not 
raised below and therefore may not be raised 
on appeal. We disagree with the State's cha-
racterization of the issue. Defendant's mem-
orandum in support of the motion to suppress 
and his brief clearly address the constitution-
ality of the roadblock stop. Therefore, the 
constitutionality of the roadblock stop is 
squarely before this court. 
In State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(Utah Ct. App. March 15, 1991), this court 
addressed the constitutionality of a virtually 
identical roadblock stop and held that the 
roadblock stop violated defendant's state and 
federal constitutional rights. In Sims, defen-
dant was stopped at a roadblock on I-lf 
about two miles south of Nephi, Utah. Th< 
roadblock, staffed by about ten officers, wa 
planned and supervised by Sergeant Pau 
Mangelson, and its purpose was to detec 
license, registration, liquor and drug violat 
ions. Notice of the roadblock was published i 
the local paper two to four weeks earliei 
Sergeant Mangelson testified that no writte 
policy existed governing the roadblock an 
that his supervisor gave him permission I 
conduct the roadblock. All vehicles wei 
stopped, except trucks. At about 9:00 a.m 
Trooper Howard stopped Sims and request* 
his license and registration. While talking wi 
Sims, Trooper Howard saw an open liqu 
bottle and shortly thereafter obtained Simi 
consent to search the vehicle. 
The court, relying on Michigan Dep't 
State Police v. Sitzt __U.S.__, 110 S.Ct. 24 
(1990), held that because the roadblock v 
not carried out pursuant to a plan embodyi 
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct 
the individual officers, because the plain s 
not developed by politically accountable o 
54 State v. Park 158 Utah Adv RCP 52 
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cials, and because there was no indication that 
the authorization process involved any balan-
cing of fourth amendment interests, law enf-
orcement interests, or an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the roadblock in meeting those 
interests, the roadblock violated defendant's 
fourth amendment rights. 
As in Sims, the roadblock in this case was 
two miles south of Nephi, Utah on M5, was 
supervised by Sergeant Mangleson, and was 
publicized in the local paper several weeks 
earlier. All traffic except large trucks was 
stopped in both this case and in Sims. Serg-
eant Mangelson testified at the suppression 
hearing that the roadblock was authorized by 
his supervisor. No other evidence was submi-
tted indicating that the roadblock was carried 
out pursuant to a plan with explicit, neutral 
limitations on the officers* conduct, or that it 
was developed by politically accountable off-
icials. In addition, there was no indication that 
the authorization process involved any balan-
cing of interests. Therefore, as in Sims, the 
roadblock did not conform to the standard set 
forth in Sitz. Therefore, we hold that the 
roadblock stop violated defendant's fourth 
amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.1 
We next address whether defendant volun-
tarily consented to the search of the vehicle. 
The State contends, as it did in Sims, that this 
issue was not raised below and may therefore 
not be raised on appeal. Ordinarily, a defen-
dant may not assert a ground for suppressing 
evidence if that ground was not asserted in the 
trial court. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah 1985). However, if a ground for supp-
ressing evidence is unknown or unavailable to 
a defendant at the time the motion to suppress 
is filed, defendant does not waive his right to 
raise that issue. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 
(Utah 1981). 
At the time of defendant's suppression 
hearing, in this case and in Sims, Utah case 
law provided that a non-coerced search 
consent purged the taint of a primary illega-
lity. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. at 13; see State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). However, in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
684 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed this court's decision in Stare v. 
Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
and held that consent to search a vehicle fol-
lowing a primary illegality must be both non-
coerced and not obtained by exploitation of 
the primary illegality. Therefore, because this 
argument was effectively unavailable to defe-
ndant, just as the argument was unavailable to 
Sims, defendant did not waive the right to 
raise the consent issue. 
In Sims, the court addressed whether defe-
ndant's consent, given shortly after the roa-
dblock stop and after the officer saw an open 
liquor bottle in the vehicle, was sufficiently 
attenuated from or an exploitation of the 
illegal stop. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13-
14. The court examined several factors to 
evaluate whether the consent was obtained by 
exploitation of the stop, including the temp-
oral proximity of the primary illegality and the 
consent, the presence of intervening circums-
tances, and the purpose and fiagrancy of the 
illegal police conduct. Id. The court stated 
that because the consent was obtained within 
minutes of the illegal stop, it was not suffici-
ently attenuated from the primary illegality to 
purge the taint. Further, the court found, the 
record did not reveal any intervening circum-
stances which broke the chain of events which 
began with the illegal roadblock. Finally, the 
court stated that the purpose of the illegal 
police conduct did not correct the constituti-
onal violation. In sum, the court concluded 
that Sims's consent was arrived at by exploi-
tation of the illegal roadblock and that all 
evidence obtained under that consent must be 
suppressed. 
In this case, as in Sims, defendant's consent 
was obtained within minutes of the illegal 
stop. Between the stojy and defendant's 
consent to search, no intervening events occ-
urred which broke the chain of events begin-
ning with the illegal roadblock. Finally, the 
purpose of the illegal police conduct did not 
correct the constitutional violation. See Sims, 
156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. Therefore, because 
the record demonstrates that defendant's 
consent was obtained by exploitation of the 
illegal roadblock, we hold that the consent was 
invalid and all evidence seized pursuant to that 
consent must be suppressed. 
Because we reverse the trial court's denial 
of the motion to suppress, we need not 
address defendant's claim that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for a directed 
verdict. 
Defendant's convictions are reversed and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. We need not address whether the roadblock vio-
lated defendant's state constitutional rights because 
the roadblock does not pass muster under the 
federal constitution. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED STATE V. ARROYO, 
796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN A MANNER THAT 
APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH FLORIDA V, 
ROYER, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), WHICH ARROYO 
IDENTIFIED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION 
OF THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE TWO-PART 
TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT 
TO SEARCH; THE ARROYO TEST SHOULD BE 
CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT. 
After the court of appeals had determined that the 
roadblock was unconstitutional under the federal and state 
constitutions, it then addressed the question of whether the 
drugs seized from defendant's vehicle were nevertheless 
admissible because their seizure resulted from a search conducted 
pursuant to defendant's consent. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13-
14. 
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that 
defendant did not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to 
the search, but that he claimed that "there was insufficient 
attenuation between his detention and the consent . . . to purge 
the taint of the illegality of the detention,," I£. at 13. It 
noted that under State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), "to 
be constitutionally valid, a search consent following illegal 
police behavior must be both noncoerced and not arrived at by 
exploitation of the primary police illegality." Ibid. Applying 
the factors outlined in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), 
for evaluating the "non-exploitation or attenuation element," the 
court held that "the record demonstrates that [defendant]'s 
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of 
the illegal roadblock." JTd. at 14. In arriving at this 
conclusion, the court relied most heavily on two factors: (1) 
"the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, and 
not even under our clear error standard of review could the trial 
court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent 
to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) the 
record revealed no possibility of intervening circumstances 
between the illegal stop and [defendant]'s grant of consent to 
the search. Ibid. 
In Arroyo, this Court did not make clear how the 
exploitation analysis is to proceed, saying only that the primary 
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from 
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by 
that illegality. 796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown 
v. Illinois factors which should be considered, ici. at 690-91 
n.4, but did not make clear whether the primary focus of the 
exploitation analysis is the possible effect of the initial 
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent or rather 
-9-
the police misconduct itself* Arrovo cites numerous cases on the 
issue of exploitation, id., at 690-91, but does not express a 
preference for one of the two approaches those cases appear to 
adopt. 
For example, some of the cases clearly talk about the 
exploitation question in terms of the potential effect of the 
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent. See, 
e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1987) 
("[W]e hold that the consent was the product of the illegal 
detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable stop was not 
sufficiently attenuated. . . • [T]here were insufficient 
intervening circumstances that might have reduced the coercive 
nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to make a 
voluntary decision about the consent search."); United States v. 
Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no intervening events 
or lapse of time which would show [the defendant's] consent was 
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of 
the unlawful invasion'"); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 298 
(La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot 
say that [the defendant's] consent was sufficiently attenuated 
from the illegal arrest and search to be a product of her free 
will."). 
On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply 
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether 
the voluntariness of the consent had been undermined by the 
police misconduct. These cases seem to focus solely on the 
police misconduct and how it may "taint" the consent such that 
•10-
the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez. 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Thompson. 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom. 
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980). 
This approach was followed by the court of appeals in the instant 
case. 
The former approach, which focuses primarily on the 
possible effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of 
the consent, appears to be most consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 
(1983), which this Court identified as an example of the 
application of the exploitation part of the two-part test adopted 
in Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 690. There, in concluding that the 
defendant's consent to the search of his luggage was tainted by 
the prior illegal police detention, a majority of the Supreme 
Court appears to have been most concerned with the coercive 
circumstances under which the consent to search had been obtained 
and the effect that those circumstances had on the voluntariness 
of the consent. Rover. 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring) 
("I agree with the plurality that . . . [the defendant's] 
surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot be viewed as 
consensual."). 
Because the court of appeals has construed the 
exploitation prong of Arroyo to focus primarily on the "temporal 
proximity" and "intervening circumstances" factors suggested in 
that case, and has implicitly rejected the alternative view that 
-11-
the primary focus is the possible effect of the prior police 
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent — a view 
seemingly adopted in Rover. it has decided an important question 
of law which was not decided in Arroyo. but which should be 
decided by this Court* Utah R. App. P. 46(d), Accordingly/ the 
Court should grant certiorari and review the court of appeals' 
decision. /A— 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this M ^"day of May, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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the cases cited by the state are readily distinguish-
able in that no case involves two sets of Miranda 
warnings-the first followed by an equivocal 
request for counsel and the second followed by 
apparent waiver-as is the case before us. The 
cases, with the exception of Martin which we treat 
more fully in the text, instead involve some varia-
tion on the Elstad theme-statements made 
without Miranda warnings, followed by Miranda 
warnings, waiver, and further statements. 
The state additionally cites, in a letter submitted 
after argument on the petition for rehearing, State 
v. Christoffcrson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), claiming that this court there 'held that [a] 
second set fof warnings] served as a clarification of 
the equivocal request/ We do not read Christoffc-
rson this way. The police officers in Christoffcrson 
apparently ceased questioning after the equivocal 
request for counsel, and proceeded to clarify the 
defendant's equivocal request. Once they did so and 
learned that the defendant did not desire counsel, 
the officers continued interrogation. Id. at 947. We 
hesitate to read the decision as equating a mere 
second administration of Miranda warnings, even if 
no Miranda rights were then invoked, with definitive 
clarification of an equivocal request for counsel. 
Such an important and far-reaching conclusion 
would surely have been accompanied by lengthy 
discussion and analysis, which is not to be found in 
the opinion, and is at odds with language in the 
opinion noting that clarifying questions were asked 
prior to proceeding with a second set of warnings 
and further interrogation. See id. 
6. The slate's proffered analysis is further flawed in 
that the bright-line rule of Edwards, cited in Minnick 
v. Mississippi for "clarity of its command* 
and "certainty of its application," 111 S.Ct. at 490, 
would be undermined if courts were required to 
receive evidence pertaining to the lack of coercion 
attending an equivocal voluntariness of waiver of 
the request for counsel. In addition to breeding 
contempt for a cherished constitutional right, sign-
ificant judicial resources would be needlessly expe-
nded, a result clearly eschewed in Edwards and its 
progeny. 
7. Insofar as Martin's view of an analogy between 
an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent 
and an equivocal request for counsel might suggest 
otherwise, we reject that view. Cf. Roberson, 486 
U.S. at 683 (emphasizing distinction between exer-
cise of right to terminate interrogation and remain 
silent and right to counsel). 
8. The state also argues that even if defendant's 
statements must be suppressed, the derivative phys-
ical evidence, chiefly the victim's body, would be 
properly admitted, presumably by way of photogr-
aphs and descriptive testimony. The state proceeds 
upon the assumption that the interrogation subseq-
uent to defendant's equivocal reference to counsel, 
concededly a violation of the Miranda rule, was 
merely technically defective, not constitutionally 
infirm. The state calls our attention to several deci-
sions in which other courts have allowed the admi-
ssion of derivative evidence obtained subsequent to 
interrogation conducted in violation of the technical 
rules of Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Patte-
rson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 
ASS U.S. 922 (1988); In re Owen F„ 70 Md. App. 
678, 523 A.2d 627, cert, denied, 310 Md. 275, 528 
A.2d 1286 (1987); State v. Wcthercd, 110 Wash. 2d 
466, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). We find the cases cited by 
the state to be inapplicable, as each addresses viol-
ations of the Miranda rule which are not deemed 
constitutional in dimension. We have already held in 
evaluating the state's Elstad argument that the vio-
lation of defendant's right to counsel was of cons-
titutional dimension and not merely a violation of 
Miranda, 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Ame-
ndment is properly suppressed under the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 18. See, e.g.t Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 
51, 52 (1985) (interrogation subsequent to request 
for counsel violates Fifth Amendment). See also Nix 
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 & n.3 (1984). While 
we are not ignorant of the obstacles which the state 
will face in presenting a case on remand without 
evidence of the body absent the applicability of 
some exception to the exclusionary rule, see Sampson, 
143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 & n.19, the 
derivative evidence of the child's body was obtained 
as a direct result of interrogation that was improper 
as a matter of constitutional law, and must, absent 
some exception, be suppressed. We are not enthus-
iastic about the obstacles our decision will create to 
securing defendant's conviction on retrial. But we 
are unwilling to sidestep important constitutional 
safeguards to assuage the frustrations that inhere in 
retrying a defendant clearly guilty of such a heinous 
crime. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 442. 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Louie Edwin Sims appeals his conviction of 
possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute for value, Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-8(1 )(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), a second 
degree felony. Sims claims the stop of his 
vehicle in a roadblock conducted by the Utah 
Highway Patrol was an unreasonable seizure 
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under the fourth amendment to the United I 
States Constitution and under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Following oral argument, three cases rele-
vant to the issues presented in this appeal were 
decided. Those cases are Michigan Dep't of 
State Police v. Sitz, _ U . S . _ , 110 S.Ct. 2481 
(1990); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990); and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990). Accordingly, we granted Sims' 
motion for supplemental briefing. Having 
considered the supplemental briefs, we now 
reverse his conviction, and remand for a new 
trial in which evidence seized from Sims' 
vehicle is to be suppressed. 
FACTS 
On the morning of July 27, 1988, officers 
from the Utah Highway Patrol and Juab 
County Sheriffs Office conducted a roadb-
lock on Interstate Highway 15 approximately 
two miles south of Nephi, Utah. The roadb-
lock was planned and supervised by Utah 
Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul Mangelson.1 Its 
purpose *as to detect driver's license, auto-
mobile registration, and equipment violations, 
as well as liquor and drug violations. Notice 
that the roadblock would take place was 
published in the Juab County Times News two 
to four weeks prior to the roadblock. There 
was no evidence that the News was distributed 
outside of Juab County. Interstate 15 is a 
major north-south route and link between 
Salt Lake City, Utah and Los Angeles, Calif-
ornia. 
According to Mangelson, no written policy, 
from the Highway Patrol or from any other 
source, existed to guide the conduct of the 
roadblock in question. Mangelson indicated 
that his supervising lieutenant had given him 
permission to conduct the roadblock. 
The roadblock was staffed by about ten 
uniformed officers. A series of three signs 
within a one-half mile distance directed 
drivers to the roadblock, marked by orange 
cones. Large trucks were not stopped, because 
stopping them might cause hazardous traffic 
congestion. Sergeant Mangelson instructed 
officers to inspect driver's licenses and vehicle 
registration of the stopped motorists; while 
doing this, they were to watch for signs of 
liquor and drug violations. Officers could hold 
vehicles for further investigation if the initial 
contact raised questions. One of the officers, 
Trooper Carl Howard, indicated that his 
practice also included asking all drivers, reg-
ardless of suspicion, if they had alcohol, 
weapons, or contraband in their vehicles.2 
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Sims' vehicle, 
a Chrysler sedan, was stopped at the roadb-
lock. Trooper Howard, the first officer to 
contact Sims, saw nothing to cause him to 
suspect a violation of the law as Sims' vehicle 
approached.3 Howard asked for Sims* I 
driver's license and vehicle registration. Sims I 
produced a valid Georgia driver's license and 
a Utah registration in his name. In response to 
the trooper's question, Sims stated that he 
was en route from Los Angeles to Salt Lake 
City. While talking with Sims, Trooper 
Howard smelled alcohol inside the sedan and 
saw an "open" liquor bottle in the back seat 
area. He asked Sims if there were any alcohol, 
weapons, or drugs in the vehicle. Sims admi-
tted that there was alcohol in the vehicle, but 
denied carrying drugs or weapons. 
Howard then asked Sims to exit the sedan, 
and asked for consent to look inside. Sims 
consented. Sergeant Mangelson approached 
and helped Howard search the car's interior. 
They discovered the remnants of one or two 
marijuana cigarettes in the right rear passenger 
door ashtray. Howard then asked Sims if he 
would mind if they searched the trunk of the 
sedan. Sims agreed and opened the trunk. 
Mangelson searched the trunk while Howard 
conducted field sobriety tests on Sims nearby. 
In a suitcase in the trunk, Mangelson disc-
overed two small plastic bags containing 
marijuana. Sims, becoming visibly nervous, 
then stated that he wanted the search stopped. 
Mangelson told Sims that, based on the disc-
overy of marijuana, he had probable cause to 
continue searching the trunk. Looking in the 
spare tire well, Mangelson found a kilogram 
brick of cocaine. Sims was then arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Before trial, Sims filed a motion to suppress 
all evidence seized from his vehicle, conten-
ding that the roadblock stop was an unlawful 
seizure under the Utah and federal constitut-
ions and that the officers lacked probable 
cause to search the trunk. Following an evid-
entiary hearing, the trial court denied Sims' 
motion. The court determined that (1) the 
roadblock stop did not violate the Utah or 
federal constitutions; (2) Sims voluntarily 
consented to the search of the vehicle, inclu-
ding the trunk; and (3) Sergeant Mangelson 
had probable cause to continue searching the 
trunk after Sims' withdrawal of consent. 
Based on the evidence presented at the supp-
ression hearing and on the parties* written 
stipulation xo the evidence, the trial court 
found Sims guilty of possession of a contro-
lled substance with intent to distribute. 
ISSUES 
On appeal, Sims argues that (1) the roadb-
lock stop of his vehicle violated his right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Const-
itution and the fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution; and (2) there was 
insufficient attenuation between the unlawful 
detention and any consent to overcome the 
illegality of the roadblock. 
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ROADBLOCK 
Sims' first point on appeal deals solely with 
the permissibility of the roadblock itself. 
Because it is undisputed that the roadblock 
was conducted with neither a warrant nor 
suspicion of wrongdoing by Sims, and that no 
emergency situation necessitated it, the ques-
tion of whether the roadblock was improper is 
reduced to one of law, and we review it 
without deference to the trial court. Scharf v. 
BMC Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
The State neither contests nor accepts Sims' 
arguments that the roadblock violated the 
fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Rather, the State invites us to 
decide this case solely on the basis of the att-
enuation issue. That is, we are to "assum[e] 
arguendo that the stop was illegal," and 
remand this case for fact finding on whether 
Sims' consent to search his vehicle was obta-
ined through exploitation of the stop. 
We believe it inappropriate in this case, 
however, to simply assume that the roadblock 
was unconstitutional, without analysis. Sims 
has steadfastly and thoroughly argued the 
unconstitutionality of the roadblock, on both 
federal and state grounds, throughout these 
proceedings.4 The transcript of the suppression 
hearing and the trial court's written findings 
on the issue provide an ample factual record 
from which we can assess the constitutionality 
of this roadblock. The issue, therefore, has 
been properly preserved and squarely prese-
nted on appeal. 
We are aware of the rule that we should 
avoid addressing constitutional issues unless 
required to do so. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). This roadblock, 
however, was not an isolated incident, and our 
police may continue to use suspicionless roa-
dblocks as a law enforcement tool.5 This 
makes all Utah motorists subject to closer 
police scrutiny than they might expect or, 
arguably, be legitimately required to encou-
nter. 
The right of citizens to be secure from 
unreasonable seizures "shall not be violated." 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, 
§14 (emphasis added). A roadblock or mot-
orist "checkpoint" is a seizure under the 
fourth amendment, Michigan Dep't of State 
Police v. Sitz, _ U . S . _ , 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485 
(1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); there is no reason to 
hold otherwise with respect to our state cons-
titution. For the benefit of our citizens, as well 
as that of police charged with enforcing our 
laws, it behooves us to decide whether the 
roadblock that netted Sims was constitution-
ally permissible. We hold that it was not. 
Statutory Authority to Conduct Roadblocks. 
A prelude to the constitutional analysis per 
se is a determination of whether any statutory 
authority either permits or prohibits roadbl-
ocks of the sort conducted here, that is, a 
suspicionless, investigatory roadblock in which 
vehicles and drivers are screened for possible 
violations of law.* We note several statutes of 
interest, but none apply here. 
The Utah Department of Transportation 
operates ports of entry at which all large 
vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock are 
stopped and inspected for, among other 
things, driver qualifications, registration, tax 
payments, size and weight, and safety. Utah 
Code Ann. §27-12-19 (Supp. 1990). Our 
fish and game laws give the Division of Wil-
dlife authority to conduct roadblocks or game 
checking stations under Utah Code Ann. §23-
20-19 (1984), which makes it unlawful to fail 
to stop at such stations. These provisions are 
obviously inapplicable here. 
We also note that the Utah Highway Patrol 
is charged with the duty of "regulat(ing] 
traffic on all highways and roads of the 
state." Utah Code Ann. §27-10-4(l)(b) 
(1989). This provision might authorize road-
block-type operations at, for example, acci-
dent scenes, or where hazardous road or 
traffic conditions require extra control. 
However, because this section in no way 
implies authority to conduct investigatory 
operations, it does not apply here. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1990) allows 
a peace officer to "stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions."7 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. §41-M7(c) 
(1988) requires officers to stop a vehicle for 
driver's license, registration, and general ins-
pection "upon reasonable belief that any 
vehicle is being operated in violation of any 
provision of this act or of any other law reg-
ulating the operation of vehicles ...." These 
codifications of the familiar "reasonable sus-
picion" standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), were clearly not enacted with roadb-
lock-type stops in mind; rather, they apply to 
the singling out of particular individuals or 
vehicles by the police, based on particularized 
suspicion. 
We find nothing in the Utah code that 
specifically prohibits the roadblock that was 
conducted here, however. Therefore, we query 
whether the roadblock was constitutionally 
prohibited. 
Fourth Amendment. 
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), 
the United States Supreme Court implied that 
roadblock stops for the purpose of checking 
driver's licenses and vehicle registrations 
might be constitutionally permitted. Holding 
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that a routine stop of an individual vehicle for 
such purpose, without articulable individual-
ized suspicion of wrongdoing, was impermis-
sible under the fourth amendment, the Court 
commented that "[t]his holding does not pre-
clude the State of Delaware or other States 
from developing methods for spot checks that 
involve less intrusion or that do not involve 
the unconstrained exercise of discretion. 
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadb-
lock-type stops is one possible alternative/ Id. 
at 663. 
The Prouse dictum fell on receptive ears, 
and in S/rz, the Court considered an investig-
atory roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint/ 
operated by the Michigan State Police Depa-
rtment. The checkpoint was operated under 
guidelines created by a special state advisory 
committee composed of law enforcement 
officials and transportation researchers from 
the University of Michigan. Those guidelines 
governed checkpoint publicity, site selection, 
and police procedure at the checkpoint itself. 
S/rz, 110 S.Ct. at 2483-84. 
Under the guidelines, all motorists traveling 
through the checkpoint were stopped and 
briefly checked for intoxication. Only if the 
initial examination revealed signs of intoxica-
tion would a motorist would be directed out 
of the traffic flow for a driver's license and 
registration check and further sobriety tests. 
The Sitz checkpoint was maintained for one 
hour and fifteen minutes. During that time, 
126 vehicles were stopped for an average of 
twenty-five seconds each. The checkpoint 
yielded two arrests-approximately one and 
one-half percent of stopped drivers-for 
driving under the influence. Id. at 2484. 
Utilizing a balancing test developed in United 
States v. Martinez-Fucrtc, 428 U.S. 
543 (1976) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 
(1979), the Supreme Court held that Mich-
igan's sobriety checkpoint passed fourth 
amendment muster. The brief detention of 
motorists at the checkpoint was found to be 
only a "slight" infringement of their fourth 
amendment interests. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2486. 
Outweighing this infringement were "the 
magnitude of the drunken driving problem 
[and] the States' interest in eradicating i t / id. 
at 2485, along with the Court's assessment 
that the one and one-half percent drunk 
driver arrest rate demonstrated that the chec-
kpoint adequately advanced that interest. Id. 
at 2487-88; see also Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-
51 and cases cited therein (permissibility of 
non-arrest seizure requires weighing public 
interest served thereby, degree to which it 
serves the interest, and severity of interference 
with individual liberty). 
According to the testimony of Sergeant 
Mangelson and Trooper Howard, the roadb-
lock in the present case was of an "all-
purpose" variety. All vehicles except trucks 
were checked for licenses, registration, equi-
pment problems, driver sobriety, and signs of 
illicit drugs, without any suspicion of wrong-
doing. The trial court, focusing on the last 
purpose, performed a balancing test as descr-
ibed above. It held that "a history of escala-
ting drug traffic along this stretch of Interstate 
15 as a result of other arrests, tends to legiti-
mize the public interest in predetermined check 
points, systematically pursued by officers to 
minimize the burden to individual citizens 
without discretion to engage in random roving 
stops/1 Without passing judgment on the 
accuracy of the trial court's balancing, we 
believe that analysis was premature and ther-
efore erroneous. 
As we read Sitz, Martinez-Fuertc, and Brown, 
a fourth amendment balancing test 
applies to warrantless seizures that, if not 
based upon articulable suspicion of an indiv-
idual, "musf be carried out pursuant to a plan 
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the 
conduct of individual officers/ Brown, 443 
U.S. at 51 (emphasis added). Additionally, 
such a plan should be developed by 
"politically accountable officials" with a 
"unique understanding of, and a responsibility 
for, limited, public resources, including a finite 
number of police officers." Sitz, 110 S.Ct at 
2487. Those officials, and not the courts, are 
responsible for performing the initial balan-
cing between the fourth amendment and the 
interests served by the plan. Id. While the Sitz 
sobriety checkpoint met these requirements, 
the roadblock used here did not. 
No explicit plan, beyond a determination 
that all vehicles other than large trucks were to 
be stopped, governed this roadblock.9 Nor 
does it appear that Sergeant Mangelson or the 
lieutenant who gave him permission to 
conduct the roadblock are politically accoun-
table officials as contemplated in Sitz.10 The 
process by which the roadblock was author-
ized also lacked features of political account-
ability that were arguably present in Sitr. the 
Sitz roadblock was authorized pursuant to 
careful advance study that included non-
police public officials, while authority for this 
roadblock arose solely within a police agency. 
Finally, there is no indication that the autho-
rization process here involved any balancing of 
fourth amendment interests and law enforce-
ment interests, or an assessment of the effec-
tiveness of the roadblock in meeting those 
interests. Instead, the lack of any written 
guidelines arising from the authorization 
process strongly suggests that no such analysis 
took place. 
The requirement of explicit guidelines, 
developed in a politically accountable manner 
that includes balancing of the relevant conc-
erns, is, under Sitz, a prerequisite to any 
judicial balancing analysis of a suspicionless 
roadblock.11 After-the-fact judicial balan-
cing of the interests implicated by such a 
roadblock cannot make it constitutionally 
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proper. Therefore, we hold that the roadblock 
in which Sims was detained violated the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution.12 
Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 14. 
The Sitz emphasis on roadblock guidelines 
stresses the principle that when police operat-
ions interfere with fourth amendment inter-
ests, "the discretion of the official in the field 
[must] be circumscribed, at least to some 
extent/ Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
661 (1979) (citations omitted). Sitz implicitly 
places both guideline development and the 
decision to utilize suspicionless roadblocks in 
the first place in the hands of "politically 
accountable" officials. We view roadblock 
authorization and guideline development as 
separate steps, however. The initial decision to 
permit suspicionless roadblocks is especially 
critical, and requires a higher degree of polit-
ical accountability than the guideline develo-
pment step. Sims argues that the lack of stat-
utory authority renders suspicionless roadbl-
ocks improper under the Utah Constitution. 
As regards the initial authority to permit such 
roadblocks, we agree. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion is virtually identical to the fourth amen-
dment. Like its federal counterpart, it consists 
of a "reasonableness" clause and a "warrant" 
clause: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable sear-
ches and seizures shall not be viol-
ated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
In Srafe v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, decrying the 
United States Supreme Court's "vacillation 
between the warrant approach and the reaso-
nableness approach" regarding automobile 
searches, id. at 469, reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the warrant approach under our 
constitution, stating that "(w)arrantless sear-
ches and seizures are per se unreasonable 
unless exigent circumstances require action 
before a warrant can be obtained." Id. at 470 
(quoting Srafe v. Christenscn, 676 P.2d 408, 
411 (Utah 1984)). 
In Larocco, a car theft suspect's expectation 
of privacy in the interior of the subject car, 
parked unattended and unlocked on a public 
street, triggered the application of article I, 
section 14. 794 P.2d at 468-69. Police offi-
cers' warrantless opening of the car's door to 
view the vehicle identification number on the 
doorjamb was found to constitute a search 
subject to the fourth amendment's warrant 
requirement. The search was then held impr-
oper under article I, section 14, because there 
was no threat that the car would disappear 
before a warrant could be obtained to look 
inside it. The court held that such 'exigent 
circumstances" to support a warrantless search 
did not exist where the car was not en route 
away from the officers' jurisdiction and the 
suspect had not been alerted to police interest 
in it. Id. at 470-71. 
Under article 1, section 14 our supreme 
court applies a * warrants whenever possible" 
policy to motor vehicle searches and seizures. 
Id. This policy is consistent with one funda-
mental purpose of constitutional search and 
seizure limits: the interposition of neutral 
authority between police seeking evidence of 
crimes and the citizens from whom such evi-
dence is sought.13 
In the usual non-exigent circumstances 
search and seizure scenario, the judicial 
branch, through a magistrate, serves as the 
neutral authority that issues or denies a 
warrant to perform a search or seizure. The 
warrant is issued only when probable cause 
exists. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, 
art. I, §14. Our state legislature, however, 
has also served as a neutral authority between 
our police and our citizens, in authorizing 
certain seizures upon less than probable cause. 
As already noted, our legislature has foll-
owed the courts' lead in authorizing brief 
warrantless stops of individuals and motor 
vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.14 Also 
as noted, the legislature has acted independe-
ntly in authorizing ports of entry, as well as 
fish and game checkpoints. These operations, 
supported by neither warrants nor any level of 
individualized suspicion, clearly implicate 
article I, section \A of our constitution. 
From an operational standpoint, ports of 
entry and fish and game checkpoints closely 
resemble the roadblock that was conducted in 
this case, in that all large trucks, or all vehi-
cles used by hunters, respectively, are submi-
tted to official inspections. However, in aut-
horizing these operations, our legislature has, 
presumably, weighed the need for such suspi-
cionless inspections against their intrusion 
upon individual liberty,15 a process analogous 
to that performed by a magistrate in the iss-
uance of a warrant. A high degree of political 
accountability for the institution of these 
practices can also be presumed, in that repre-
sentatives of truckers, hunters, law enforce-
ment, and the citizenry at large all very likely 
played a part in passing the relevant statutes. 
In each case of legislation authorizing spe-
cific types of checkpoints or stops of persons 
or vehicles, with or without individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing, the citizens of this 
state have acted through their elected repres-
entatives. Therefore, the collective will of the 
people is expressed and, furthermore, the 
people have notice of duly authorized police 
activity. 
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In stark contrast, the roadblock conducted I 
in this case was authorized solely by police 
officers, the very people whose behavior 
article I, section 14 is intended to limit. No 
non-law enforcement officials took part in 
the decision to set up the roadblock. Leaving 
the initial decision to conduct such operations 
in police hands creates a scheme that is both 
unrealistic and constitutionally untenable. 
We believe that legislative authorization of 
ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints, 
like the issuance of a judicial warrant, triggers 
at least some presumption that these law enf-
orcement practices are constitutionally perm-
issible. Because the roadblock in this case had 
neither form of authorization, it was entitled 
to no such presumption. Both warrants and 
statutes originate outside the executive branch, 
serving to check abuses of that branch's law 
enforcement power. Consistent with our 
supreme court's emphasis on the warrant 
requirement, then, we hold that suspicionless, 
investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks, con-
ducted without legislative authorization, are 
per se unconstitutional under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
In requiring legislative authority as a prer-
equisite to the use of suspicionless investiga-
tory roadblocks, we join two other western 
states that have similarly construed their con-
stitutions. See, e.g., Srare v. Henderson, 114 
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988); Nelson v. 
Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 
(1987)." At least one other state has establi-
shed the same standard under the fourth 
amendment. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 
(Okla. App. 1984). This approach is particul-
arly appropriate where a proposed police 
practice will, as here, affect everyone travel-
ling our state's highways. Because of its close 
ties to the citizens whose rights will be affe-
cted, the minimum necessary political accou-
ntability for such practices lies, at the outset, 
with our legislature. 
Our holding that article I, section 14 proh-
ibits suspicionless investigative roadblocks 
without legislative authority, in effect, requires 
the legislature to perform the S/fz-type bal-
ancing function if and when it decides to 
consider the authorization of such roadblocks. 
Judicial balancing of the interests implicated 
by such roadblocks, then, will need to occur 
only if and when the legislature, upon perfo-
rming such balancing itself, decides to autho-
rize them." We, unlike our colleague in his 
concurring opinion, prefer that the legislature 
announce its view of public policy and the 
philosophy of Utah's citizenry as regards 
roadblocks, prior to the court applying cons-
titutional analysis to the legislature's product.M 
We also emphasize that our holding on the 
state constitutionality of the roadblock in 
which Sims was stopped is limited in its app- I 
lication to similar, non-emergency situations. 
It is not intended to apply to emergency roa-
dblocks that might, for example, be used to 
apprehend a fleeing felon. Nor do we intend 
to impede any existing authority to conduct 
roadblocks for traffic control purposes. Any 
constitutional challenge to these types of 
traffic stops awaits another day. It is the sus-
picionless, investigative, non-emergency 
roadblock, conducted in the absence of legis-
lative authority, that we hold to be unconsti-
tutional. 
ATTENUATION OF CONSENT FROM 
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK 
Sims argues that there was insufficient att-
enuation between his detention and the consent 
he gave to search his vehicle to purge the taint of 
the illegality of the detention. He does not claim 
that his consent was coerced from him and was 
therefore involuntary. Rather, he argues that 
because there were no intervening circumstances 
between the detention and the consent, the con-
sent was the fruit of the illegal detention, and, 
therefore, evidence seized pursuant to his con-
sent should have been ordered suppressed. Sims 
did not mak.e this argument in the trial court. 
Normally, "where a defendant fails to assert 
a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully 
obtained evidence in the trial court, an appe-
llate court will not consider that ground on 
appeal." State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah 1985); see also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 71 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 12. Unless a ground for suppression 
is "unknown or unavailable" to a defendant at 
the time a suppression motion is filed, the 
right to challenge the admission of evidence on 
that ground is waived. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
48, 53 (Utah 1981). Here, however, because 
our then-standing decisions effectively held 
that a non-coerced search consent, by itself, 
purged the taint of a primary illegality, Sims* 
non-attenuation argument was unavailable to 
him in the trial court and would have been 
pointless to assert. See State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). There-
fore, it is proper to address that argument 
now. 
In Srare v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing this 
court's holding in Srare v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 
153, 155-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), held that, 
to be constitutionally valid, a search consent 
following illegal police behavior must be both 
noncoerced and not arrived at by exploitation 
of the primary police illegality. Factors used to 
evaluate the non-exploitation or attenuation 
element are derived from Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590 (1975), which involved a confe-
ssion obtained from a criminal suspect after 
his illegal arrest. They include the temporal 
proximity of the primary illegality and the 
granting of consent, the presence or absence 
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of intervening circumstances, and the purpose 
and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. AT-
royo% 796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4 (citing Brown, All 
U.S. at 603-04, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure §8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 1987)). 
The Arroyo case was remanded to the trial 
court for fact finding on the issue of whether 
the defendant's consent to search his vehicle 
was attenuated from or an exploitation of his 
illegal stop. Because the burden is on the State 
to show that evidence obtained following 
illegal police conduct is attenuated from the 
illegality, Brown, All U.S. at 604, and because 
the attenuation issue was not presented to the 
trial court, a remand to examine the attenua-
tion factors has been suggested here. We find, 
however, that the record now before us cont-
ains "sufficient detail and depth" to allow us 
to determine the issue as a matter of law. See id. 
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, 
the record demonstrates a very short time span 
between Sims' stop in the roadblock and 
Trooper Howard's request to search his aut-
omobile. The trooper had but a brief conver-
sation with Sims, regarding his license and 
registration, his trip itinerary, and possession 
of alcohol, guns, or contraband, before asking 
for consent to search his car. The consent was 
obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, 
and not even under our clear error standard of 
review could the trial court find enough time 
between the stop and the grant of consent to 
attenuate the relationship between the two.19 
Nor does the record reveal any possibility of 
intervening circumstances between the illegal 
stop and Sims' grant of consent to the search. 
Such circumstances must be independent of 
the primary illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-
91. Here, Trooper Howard's request for 
consent to search Sims' sedan was based upon 
the smell of alcohol, the sight of the open 
liquor bottle in the sedan, and Sims' admis-
sion, uneventful since the bottle was in 
obvious view, that he was carrying alcohol. 
Howard's opportunity to make these observ-
ations and to question Sims, however, depe-
nded entirely on the illegal roadblock. Neither 
Sims' driving nor the external appearance of 
his vehicle justified stopping him. Nothing 
occurred which could have reasonably made 
him feel free to proceed on his journey at any 
time between the moment of his stop and the 
discoveries that prompted the trooper's 
request for consent to search his vehicle.20 
Sims did not spontaneously volunteer his 
consent, but gave it only when asked. Sims' 
consent, then, arose from an unbroken chain 
of events that began with the illegal roadb-
lock. 
The final factor in the attenuation analysis 
is an examination of the purpose and flagr-
ancy of the primary police illegality. Here, this 
factor, unlike the first two, appears unrelated 
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I to the question of whether a search consent 
flowed from, i.e., was an exploitation of, the 
illegal police conduct.31 Instead, it appears to 
I be an alternative approach, inviting us to 
overlook unconstitutional police conduct that 
serves good purposes and is not too flagrant. 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testified 
at some length about their expertise in drug 
interdiction, and the trial court treated the 
roadblock as if that was its primary purpose. 
However noble this purpose might be, it was 
pursued by an unauthorized means. The tro-
opers each had years of law enforcement 
experience, and can properly be charged with 
awareness that their action was not authorized 
by law. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding." Olms-
tend v. United States, 111 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to twelve 
law officers to staff the roadblock may have 
also left distant parts of the largely rural jur-
isdiction with delayed police assistance in the 
event of need. Thus, although it does not 
appear that the officers behaved abusively 
toward those stopped at the roadblock, this 
does not correct the constitutional violation. 
In sum, the record demonstrates that Sims' 
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by 
exploitation of the illegal roadblock. Accord-
ingly, that consent was invalid. Because the 
exclusionary rule applies to violations of both 
the fourth amendment and article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution, State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 471-73 (Utah 1990), all evid-
ence obtained under that consent must be 
suppressed. 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONTINUE 
SEARCH 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson believed 
that the discovery of marijuana in Sims* sedan 
under the consent search gave them probable 
cause to continue searching after consent was 
withdrawn. However, because the initial 
consent was invalid, any probable cause found 
while searching under that consent was also 
invalid. Absent probable cause to search the 
sedan without Sims' consent, we need not 
reach the issue of whether exigent circumsta-
nces existed to make the warrant requirement 
inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Sims' conviction for possession of a contr-
olled substance with intent to distribute is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial 
court for proceedings in accord with this 
opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
I Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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ORME, J. (concurring specially): 
While I otherwise concur fully in the court's 
opinion, 1 have two difficulties with the disc-
ussion treating the roadblock under article I, 
section 14, of the Utah Constitution. First, if 
the roadblock cannot even be validated under 
the questionable "balancing* approach of 
Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), see, 
e.g., id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 
we have no need to examine whether it might 
be additionally invalid under the state consti-
tution. Second, and more importantly, 1 am 
not enthusiastic about suggesting that the 
legislature, any more than the courts or the 
police, should be about the business of bala-
ncing away important constitutional protect-
ions that safeguard all of us so that law enf-
orcement can more readily catch an occasional 
law-breaker. The citizen's right to be free 
from police intrusion in the total absence of 
even the least suspicion of wrong-doing 
should simply not be at the mercy of the leg-
islature's determination of how tourism or our 
hopes for the Olympics might somehow be 
adversely impacted by one law enforcement 
technique or another. 
If it were necessary to reach the state cons-
titutional issue in this case, i.e., if the roadb-
lock passed muster under the federal constit-
ution, 1 would be more inclined to solidify 
longstanding constitutional precepts as at the 
core of article I, section 14, than to borrow 
the troublesome "balancing" approach embr-
aced in Sitz, adopt some variation of that 
approach, and begin a journey down that 
nebulous path. CL State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 469 (Utah 1990) (state constitutional 
analysis employed "to simplify ... the search 
and seizure rules so that they can be more 
easily followed by the police and the courts 
and, at the same time, provide the public with 
consistent and predictable protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures."). I would 
probably prefer to hold that the rule of Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), uniformly applied 
by Utah courts, is a matter of Utah constitu-
tional law that simply may not be balanced 
away by any branch of our government and 
that is not amenable to a roadblock exception. 
Under established Utah decisional law, in 
the absence of any individualized suspicion, 
only a level one stop is permitted. E.g., State 
v. Jackson, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 65 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Srare v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Trujillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A 
level one stop is a purely voluntary encounter. 
Id. And one does not lose the right to decline 
to participate in a level one encounter simply 
because one chooses to drive rather than to 
walk. See State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 
- . . ~- K— IOROV State v. Johnson, 111 
other grounds, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 
Feb. 7, 1991). See also, Delaware v. Prowsc, 
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (persons do not lose 
the protections of fourth amendment "when 
they step from the sidewalk into their autom-
obiles"); State v. Talbot, 789 P.2d 489, 491, 
494 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
If, as seems clear, the police cannot require 
every pedestrian on a stretch of sidewalk to 
stop and answer police inquiries, I am hard-
pressed to see how they can stop every car on 
a stretch of the interstate highway and require 
the driver to answer inquiries. In my view, the 
only roadblock that is sure to pass state con-
stitutional muster is one which would qualify 
as a level-one stop. Cf. Little v. State, 300 
Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1989) (roadblock 
upheld where motorists avoiding roadblock or 
otherwise refusing to cooperate not detained). 
I see no constitutional problem with a road-
side police checkpoint announced by a sign on 
the freeway, "Police Roadblock Next Exit. 
Your Cooperation in Answering Police Inqu-
iries Appreciated." Most drivers would stop, 
even though they could not be required to, 
just as most pedestrians will stop and respond 
to police inquiries on the sidewalk. But on 
neither medium of travel can one suspected of 
nothing illegal whatsoever be compelled to do 
so. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Sergeant Mangelson's efforts to thwart illegal 
drug trafficking are well known in Utah's appellate 
courts. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (reversing 
Srare v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App, 
1989)); Srare v. Ear), 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Srare v. Aquihr, 756 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). See also United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d 
991 (10th Cir. 1990). Besides the present case, at 
least one other case involving an automobile search 
by Sergeant MangeJson is pending in this court. Srare 
v. Kitchen, No. 900307-CA. As a central 
player in at least five published search and seizure 
scenarios to date, the redoubtable trooper's notor-
iety is approaching that of Max 25, a narcotics 
detection'dog whose nose for crime has figured in at 
least seven published federal cases in the District of 
Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Co/yer, 878 
F.2d 469, 471 and n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and cases 
cited therein, 
2. As indicated by the following exchange at the 
suppression hearing, an affirmative answer to this 
question could prompt Trooper Howard to then 
seek consent to search automobiles without any 
other suspicion of wrongdoing: 
Q (Mr. Mctos): Just out of curiosity, 
did anybody answer 'yes" Jto query 
about alcohol, weapons, or contraband! 
when everything appeared in order so 
you would have to conduct a further 
search? 
A (Trooper Howard): Yes. I've had 
several people do that. 
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3. Re-cross examination of Trooper Howard by 
defense counsel included the following exchange: 
Q: You had no reason to believe [Sims] 
was doing anything wrong as he entered 
the roadblock or breaking any law; is 
that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
4. By thoroughly briefing state constitutional conc-
erns in his argument, Sims has answered calls by 
Utah's appellate courts for a state constitutional 
analysis of search and seizure issues. See, e.g., Earl, 
716 P.2d at 805-06; State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 
425,426 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing cases). 
5. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
6. Under our characterization of thfs roadblock, it 
does not fit into the traditional "three levels" of 
police stops, that have been described as follows: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
[any time] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion* 
that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 
Sfafe v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 
736 F.2d 223. 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 
U.S. 1142 (1986)). The level of individualized susp-
icion, i.e., none, is the same as with a level one 
stop. However, since drivers were required to stop 
and had no opportunity to decline to participate, the 
roadblock stop went well beyond a level one enco-
unter. It did not, however, qualify as a level two or 
three stop, since no individualized suspicion prom-
pted the stop. 
7. This provision has been characterized as a legisl-
atively enacted version of the so-called level two 
stop. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); note 6 supra. 
8. The court's definition of the public interest 
pursued, i.e., detection of illegal drug trafficking, 
appears to be contrary to testimony about the gen-
eralized purposes of the roadblock. There was no 
finding as to the actual efficacy of the roadblock in 
meeting the public purposes described by the offi-
cers or the more specific purposes identified by the 
court. 
9. While we understand that allowing large trucks to 
bypass the roadblock may be necessary for safety's 
sake, we wonder about the implications of this 
procedure for effective drug interdiction. The pro-
cedure seems to invite drug traffickers to transport 
their contraband in large trucks, and possibly rela-
tively massive quantities, to avoid detection. 
10. Compare United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 
(10th Cir. 1987), upholding the constitutionality of a 
roadblock for the purpose of checking driver's lic-
enses, vehicle registration, and insurance, pursuant 
only to the permission of a stale police supervisor. 
Corral does not cite Brown's requirement, adopted 
in Sitz, of a plan explicitly limiting officer discre-
tion. In view of the reiteration of that requirement 
we find in Siu, we do not accept CorraTs implica-
tion that supervisory permission to conduct a road-
block constitutes an adequate 'plan.9 
Corral was cited in United States v. McFayden, 
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which, in turn, was 
relied on by the trial court in holding the roadblock 
in this case constitutional. McFayden involved 
•traffic control" roadblocks set up to deal with 
traffic congestion associated with street level drug 
trafficking. The McFayden roadblocks were found 
to pass the reasonableness balancing test of Brown. 
Those roadblocks, again in contrast to the present 
situation, were carried out pursuant to a coordin-
ated plan developed by ri\t District of Columbia 
police districts. 
11. A similar conclusion might well be reached by 
viewing the roadblock as an "administrative search." 
Supreme Court cases dealing with such searches 
have focused on the balance between the need for 
such searches and the fourth amendment values 
implicated by such searches. However, the cases also 
involved situations where the challenged search was, 
at least arguably, authorized by statute or ordin-
ance. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (federal statute); Caroara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)(city 
housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 
(1967) (city building code). 
12. Our uncritical treatment of Siu and other 
federal cases should not be taken as approval of the 
analysis employed, or result reached, in these cases. 
We merely accede to the preeminent position of the 
United States Supreme Court in construing the 
United States Constitution. 
13. Our analysis under the Utah constitution is 
limited to the need for legislative authorization. We 
note, however, that Justice Durham's opinion in 
Larocco, requires both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless search and 
seizure under article I, section 14, which would seem 
to prohibit this roadblock and others. However, 
Larocco was a divided decision, with Justice Zim-
merman concurring, Justice Stewart concurring in 
result only, and Justices Hall and Howe dissenting. 
The final verdict for Utah roadblocks is, therefore, 
unknown. 
14. Arguably, legislative enactment of Utah Code 
Ann. §§77-7-15 (1990) and 41-l-17(c) (1988) 
may reflect a determination by our legislature to not 
simply ratify judicial expansion of police power by 
silent acquiescence, but to determine through the 
political process whether such expansion is to 
become a part of Utah's law. 
15. Indeed, in the case of port of entry stops, the 
legislature appears to have weighed liberty concerns 
with some care. Vehicles normally subject to these 
stops are exempted from stopping if doing so would 
increase their one-way trip distance by more than 
three miles or five percent. Utah Code Ann. §27-
12-19.4 (1) and (3) (Supp. 1990). 
16. In Pimental v. Dcp't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 
(R.I. 1989), and Commonwealth v. Tarberi, 348 Pa. 
Super. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985), the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania held sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional 
under their state constitutions without considering 
whether such practices could be valid if statutorily 
authorized. 
17. We note that the factors to be considered in 
performing such balancing are myriad, complex, 
and subject to debate. See, e.g., Sitz and dissenting 
opinions of Brennan and Stevens, JJ.; Nelson v. 
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